Na een ongeluk met hersenletsel wist hij precies hoe de mens zich, eenmaal van God los, zou moeten bevrijden van allerlei mythen en angsten om eindelijk een onafhankelijk individu te worden. Maar de gedachten van deze eigenzinnige Napolitaanse filosoof druisten lijnrecht in tegen de gevestigde orde en stuitten op onbegrip en hoongelach. Want Vico vertrouwde eerder op poëzie, leugens en verbeelding dan op het 'meten is weten' van Descartes.0En niemand kon vermoeden dat juist hij veel later de inspiratie zou worden (...) van denkers als Nietzsche, Hegel, Marx, Berlin, Said, Eco en Sloterdijk. Zijn adagium 'Ik fabuleer, dus ik ben' zou bovendien naadloos in onze tijd hebben gepast.0Mark Blaisse schreef een uiterst onderhoudend, geromantiseerd portret van deze briljante anarchist, een pechvogel op vrijwel elk gebied. In 'Het orakel van Napels' gidst de eigenzinnige Vico de lezer door barok Napels, langs schilderijen, theaters, castraten, vioolbouwers, verboden boekenkasten, bordelen en literaire salons. Een wereld vol populisme, corruptie en alternatieve feiten: Vico's leven en ideeën blijken verbazingwekkend actueel. (shrink)

Aan de hand van het werk van de Duitse romancier W.G. Sebald breekt Mark Anderson een lans voor een herwaardering van de melancholie, als enig mogelijke houding om de last van het verleden die we moeten dragen, te kunnen torsen. De kunsten zijn het aangewezen instrument voor deze ‘daad van verzet’ ‘tegen de krachten van vernietiging en vergeten in het menselijk leven’. Het werk van Sebald, achtervolgd door de ‘postmemory’ aan het Duitse oorlogsgeweld dat hij zelf alleen indirect (...) had meegemaakt, is hiervan een veelzeggende illustratie. (shrink)

België kende in 1991 een bewogen politiek jaar. De houding van de regering in het Golfconflict veroorzaakte spanningen in de regering-Martens VIII, die nog werden aangescherpt door de rel rond de aanwezigheid in het land van Walid Khaled, de woordvoerder van de terreurgroep van Aboe Nidal, waarover het doek pas eind juni viel. Tijdens de zomer stelde de regering, naar jaarlijkse gewoonte, de begroting voor het volgende jaar op. Tevens werden afspraken gemaakt over de verdere hervorming van de staat. (...) Tot een parlementaire behandeling van de begroting en de staatshervorming is het evenwel niet gekomen. Een dispuut over de uitvoer van wapens naar het Golf gebied leidde in september tot een politieke crisis. De Volksunie verliet de regering, die kort daarop aan communautaire tegenstellingen ten onder ging. Bij de vervroegde verkiezingen van 24 november leden de aftredende regeringspartijen verlies. Pogingen om een nieuwe regering op de been te brengen, zaten eind december nog muurvast. (shrink)

There are two principles that lend Brouwer's mathematics the extra power beyond arithmetic. Both are presented in Brouwer's writings with little or no argument. One, the principle of bar induction, will not concern us here. The other, the continuity principle for numbers, occurs for the first time in print in [4]. It is formulated and immediately applied to show that the set of numerical choice sequences is not enumerable. In fact, the idea of the continuity property can be dated fairly (...) precisely, it is to be found in the margin of Brouwer's notes for his course on Pointset Theory of 1915/16. The course was repeated in 1916/17 and he must have inserted his first formulation of the continuity principle in the fall of 1916 as new material right at the beginning of the course.In modern language, the principle readswhere α and β range over choice sequences of natural numbers, m and x over natural numbers, and stands for ⟨α, α, …, α⟩, the initial segment of α of length m.An immediate consequence of WC-N is that all full functions are continuous, and, as a corollary, that the continuum is unsplittable [28]. Note that WC-N is incompatible with Church's thesis, [22], section 4.6.After Brouwer asserted WC-N, Troelstra was the first to ask in print for a conceptual motivation, but he remained an exception; most authors followed Brouwer by simply asserting it, cf. [18].Let us note first that in one particular case the principle is obvious indeed, namely in the case of the lawless sequences. The notion of lawless sequence surfaced fairly late in the history of intuitionism. Kreisel introduced it in [17] for metamathematical purposes. There is a letter from Brouwer to Heyting in which the phenomenon also occurs [7]. This is an important and interesting fact since it is the only time that Brouwer made use of a possibility expressly stipulated in, e.g., [5], see below. (shrink)

This paper explores the centrality of self-affirmation in Bernard Lonergan’s Insight and is specifically concerned with the role of bias in relation to self-appropriation and genuineness. I begin with an explication of the process of self-affirmation and the model of knowledge it involves. I then discuss the nature of bias and its relation to genuineness in Insight. My analysis concludes that bias is never “overcome,” in the sense of being eliminated. Thus, genuine self-appropriation is never complete. Rather, being true to (...) oneself is the struggle to recognize one’s biases while still affirming what is reasonable and choosing responsible action. I also conclude that total resistance to self-affirmation is a disingenuous refusal to engage one’s biases; it is an act of evasion, or a fear of genuineness and its accompanying responsibilities. I end by briefly addressing some of these tensions in relation to Catholicism, specifically raising questions concerning our thinking and acting from within a Catholic faith. (shrink)

Geach's problem, the problem of accounting for the fact that judgements expressed using moral terms function logically like other judgements, stands in the way of most noncognitive analyses of moral judgements. The non-cognitivist must offer a plausible interpretation of such terms when they appear in conditionals that also explains their logical interaction with straightforward moral assertions. Blackburn and Gibbard have offered a series of accounts each of which interprets such conditionals as expressing higher order commitments. Each then invokes norms for (...) the coherent acceptance of attitudes to explain why we hold certain combinations inconsistent. Against these accounts the paper presses two related objections: (1) The norms needed to do the explanatory work cannot be strong enough to do that work without also ruling clearly consistent attitudes inconsistent. And (2), the norms of rational attitude acceptance do not neatly track the distinction between consistent and inconsistent attitudes. (shrink)

Motivational internalism about moral judgments is the plausible view that accepting a moral judgment is necessarily connected to motivation motivation. However, it conflicts with the Humean theory that motives must be constituted by desires. Simple versions of internalism run into problems with people who do not desire to do what they believe right. This has long been urged by David Brink. Hence, many internalists have adopted more subtle defeasible views, on which only rational agents will have a desire to act. (...) I will argue that more complex versions run into problems with self-effacing values of the sort Parfit highlights in another context. Such values can only be attained indirectly. After proposing a general account of motivation suited to the internalist thesis, I argue that Anti-Humeanism is better suited to accommodating the internalist insight. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the characteristics of digital platforms challenge the fundamental assumptions of value sensitive design (VSD). Traditionally, VSD methods assume that we can identify relevant values during the design phase of new technologies. The underlying assumption is that there is onlyepistemic uncertaintyabout which values will be impacted by a technology. VSD methods suggest that one can predict which values will be affected by new technologies by increasing knowledge about how values are interpreted or understood in context. (...) In contrast, digital platforms exhibit a novel form of uncertainty, namely,ontological uncertainty: even with full information and overview, it cannot be foreseen what users or developers will do with digital platforms. Hence, predictions about which values are affected might not hold. In this paper, we suggest expanding VSD methods to account for value dynamism resulting from ontological uncertainty. Our expansions involve (1) extending VSD to the entire lifecycle of a platform, (2) broadening VSD through the addition of reflexivity, i.e. second-order learning about what values to aim at, and (3) adding specific tools of moral sandboxing and moral prototyping to enhance such reflexivity. While we illustrate our approach with a short case study about ride-sharing platforms such as Uber, our approach is relevant for other technologies exhibiting ontological uncertainty as well, such as machine learning, robotics and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Brouwer and Husserl both aimed to give a philosophical account of mathematics. They met in 1928 when Husserl visited the Netherlands to deliver his Amsterdamer Vorträge. Soon after, Husserl expressed enthusiasm about this meeting in a letter to Heidegger, and he reports that they had long conversations which, for him, had been among the most interesting events in Amsterdam. However, nothing is known about the content of these conversations; and it is not clear whether or not there were any other (...) exchanges between them. The following is an attempt at some remarks on Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic from an intuitionistic, by which I mean a Brouwerian, point of view. I will confine myself specifically to some intuitionistic musings on Husserl’s analysis of the concept of finite number, which he developed in his Habilitationsschrift of 1887, “On the Concept of Number,” and presented again in 1891 in the first four chapters of the Philosophy of Arithmetic. It will turn out that the intuitionistic account of number is very different from Husserl’s. For instance, they strongly disagree about the number 2. On the other hand, the roots of the projects of Husserl and Brouwer have much in common. Since this fact makes their disagreement pressing and lends it much of its significance, I will begin there. (shrink)

Brouwer and Weyl recognized that the intuitive continuum requires a mathematical analysis of a kind that set theory is not able to provide. As an alternative, Brouwer introduced choice sequences. We first describe the features of the intuitive continuum that prompted this development, focusing in particular on the flow of internal time as described in Husserl's phenomenology. Then we look at choice sequences and their logic. Finally, we investigate the differences between Brouwer and Weyl, and argue that Weyl's conception of (...) choice sequences is defective on several counts. (shrink)

Brouwer and Weyl recognized that the intuitive continuum requires a mathematical analysis of a kind that set theory is not able to provide. As an alternative, Brouwer introduced choice sequences. We first describe the features of the intuitive continuum that prompted this development, focusing in particular on the flow of internal time as described in Husserl's phenomenology. Then we look at choice sequences and their logic. Finally, we investigate the differences between Brouwer and Weyl, and argue that Weyl's conception of (...) choice sequences is defective on several counts. (shrink)

There are two principles that lend Brouwer's mathematics the extra power beyond arithmetic. Both are presented in Brouwer's writings with little or no argument. One, the principle of bar induction, will not concern us here. The other, the continuity principle for numbers, occurs for the first time in print in [4]. It is formulated and immediately applied to show that the set of numerical choice sequences is not enumerable. In fact, the idea of the continuity property can be dated fairly (...) precisely, it is to be found in the margin of Brouwer's notes for his course on Pointset Theory of 1915/16. The course was repeated in 1916/17 and he must have inserted his first formulation of the continuity principle in the fall of 1916 as new material right at the beginning of the course.In modern language, the principle readswhere α and β range over choice sequences of natural numbers, m and x over natural numbers, and stands for ⟨α, α, …, α⟩, the initial segment of α of length m.An immediate consequence of WC-N is that all full functions are continuous, and, as a corollary, that the continuum is unsplittable [28]. Note that WC-N is incompatible with Church's thesis, [22], section 4.6.After Brouwer asserted WC-N, Troelstra was the first to ask in print for a conceptual motivation, but he remained an exception; most authors followed Brouwer by simply asserting it, cf. [18].Let us note first that in one particular case the principle is obvious indeed, namely in the case of the lawless sequences. The notion of lawless sequence surfaced fairly late in the history of intuitionism. Kreisel introduced it in [17] for metamathematical purposes. There is a letter from Brouwer to Heyting in which the phenomenon also occurs [7]. This is an important and interesting fact since it is the only time that Brouwer made use of a possibility expressly stipulated in, e.g., [5], see below. (shrink)

In his final interview Foucault surprised many a reader by stating that the whole of his philosophical development had been influenced by his reading of Heidegger. Until now this Foucault /Heidegger relation has been left largely unexplored, and the few articles that discussed it, took first and foremost an interest in finding parallels between the works of these thinkers. Our title, however, indicates that a different, non-doxographical approach is at stake here : the move from Foucault to Heidegger for which (...) we argue is motivated by the aporia into which Foucault's project worked itself by aspiring to be not only a genealogy but also a critique. In our first section Foucault's peculiar type of framework relativism is shown to have made it impossible for him both to stick to his most interesting philosophical concept (“order”) and to derive a critique from it which would differ from an expression of his personal whims. It is suggested, however, that this aporia is due not to the concept of "order" itself, but to the type of critique Foucault wanted to derive from it. In the remainder of the article we look for a way to reinscribe this concept into the project of a critique of objectivism. We therefore turn to Heidegger. At first a parallel between alètheia and Foucaultian “truth” is sketched. But our interest evidently lies not in the parallel as such, but in the differences that become hightlighted by the attempt to find as strict a parallel as possible. Furthermore, our questioning does not restrict itself to differences between Foucault and Heidegger, but focuses on the fissures in the work of each of them (for this reason we refer to their works by putting their author's name in quotation marks, e. g. "Foucault", thereby suggesting that their texts involve various parallellograms of forces). Thus, to prepare for the critique of objectivism we were unable to find in “Foucault”, the article goes on to outline a deconstruction of “Heidegger”. We touch on Heidegger's anti-epistemologism, on his resistance to mimesis, and on the latent subject-phobia which seems to have crept into his writing after the “Turning”. It is suggested that these problems call for a new reading of “Heidegger”, and that such a reading would not only throw an unexpected light on authenticity, both in Being and Time and in the later Heidegger, but would also enable us to analyse technological “enframing” as the highest danger in a way which may be still Heideggerian, but which differs from the argument Heidegger himself offers in The Memorial Address and The Principle of Reason. This way of problematizing the “order” or technology twists us out of Foucault's aporia, by opening up a domain which is no longer that of a politics but of an ethics of truth. (shrink)

Over the last decade there have been various attempts to use empirical data about people’s dispositions to choose to undermine various moral positions by arguing that our judgements about what to do are unreliable. Usually they are directed at non-consequentialists by consequentialists, but they have also been directed at all moral theories by skeptics about morality. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has been one of the leading proponents of such general skepticism. He has argued that empirical results particularly undermine intuitionist moral epistemology. This (...) paper is an attempt to look at what intuitionists should say in response. Consider the following argument : Regress (R1) If any person S is ever justified in believing a normative claim that p then S must be able to infer p from other beliefs of S. (shrink)

Some moral debunkers such as Sharon Street argue that evolutionary debunking arguments favor a response-dependent or subjectivist metaethics over more realist metaethical accounts. I argue that this thought conflates meta-semantics with semantics by running together mind-dependent content determination relations with mind-dependent content. Insofar as reference is broadly an epistemic relation, evolutionary debunking arguments would cause trouble for mind-independent theories of reference and content determination, since there would be no guarantee that reference would track epistemic access. But a firmly realist theory (...) of content is consistent with a mind-dependent theory of reference. I use David Hilbert's theory of color to illustrate. (shrink)

Gödel once offered an argument for the general reflection principle in set theory that took the form of an analogy with Leibniz' Monadology. I discuss the mathematical and philosophical background to Gödel's argument, reconstruct the proposed analogy in detail, and argue that it has no justificatory force.

There are two principles that lend Brouwer's mathematics the extra power beyond arithmetic. Both are presented in Brouwer's writings with little or no argument. One, the principle of bar induction, will not concern us here. The other, the continuity principle for numbers, occurs for the first time in print in [4]. It is formulated and immediately applied to show that the set of numerical choice sequences is not enumerable. In fact, the idea of the continuity property can be dated fairly (...) precisely, it is to be found in the margin of Brouwer's notes for his course on Pointset Theory of 1915/16. The course was repeated in 1916/17 and he must have inserted his first formulation of the continuity principle in the fall of 1916 as new material right at the beginning of the course.In modern language, the principle readswhere α and β range over choice sequences of natural numbers,mandxover natural numbers, andstands for ⟨α(0), α(1), …, α(m− 1)⟩, the initial segment of α of lengthm.An immediate consequence of WC-N is that all full functions are continuous, and, as a corollary, that the continuum is unsplittable [28]. Note that WC-N is incompatible with Church's thesis, [22], section 4.6.After Brouwer asserted WC-N, Troelstra was the first to ask in print for a conceptual motivation, but he remained an exception; most authors followed Brouwer by simply asserting it, cf. [18].Let us note first that in one particular case the principle is obvious indeed, namely in the case of the lawless sequences. The notion of lawless sequence surfaced fairly late in the history of intuitionism. Kreisel introduced it in [17] for metamathematical purposes. There is a letter from Brouwer to Heyting in which the phenomenon also occurs [7]. This is an important and interesting fact since it is (probably) the only time that Brouwer made use of a possibility expressly stipulated in, e.g., [5], see below. (shrink)

One popular criticism of affirmative action is that it discriminates against those who would otherwise have been offered jobs without it. This objection must rely on the non- consequentialist distinction between what we do and what we merely allow to claim that doing nothing merely allows people to be harmed by the discrimination of others, while preferential programs actively harm those left out. It fails since the present effects of past discrimination result from social arrangements which result from actions of (...) ours. We can be responsible for the effects of past discrimination, even without having discriminated, if we are responsible for that discrimination having those effects. (shrink)